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(NOT) HOLDING FIRMS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE RECKLESS INSIDER TRADING OF THEIR
EMPLOYEES
Joan MacLeod Heminway*

L INTRODUCTION

Late in 2013, federal prosecutors announced a plea agreement'
relating to criminal insider trading charges earlier brought against
S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. and some of its affiliates (SAC) under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(Section 10(b)),2 and Rule 10b-S adopted by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Section 10(b) (Rule
10b-5).3

To be the subject of criminal liability, violations of insider

trading prohibitions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S must be
willful. 4 The indictment asserts that SAC actively encouraged the

unlawful use of material nonpublic information in the conduct of its
business.5 We may never know the precise facts as to the level of
culpability and state of mind of the employees of SAC whose activities
founded the indictment. But the indictment and public portrayals of the
firm and its employees focus on the systemic nature of the alleged
violative conduct-a pattern of incentives, policies, and behaviors that
indicate highly reckless, if not intentional, misconduct.6
* @ 2016, Joan MacLeod Heminway. All rights reserved. Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law,
The University of Tennessee College of Law. J.D., New York University School of Law, 1985; A.B.,
Brown University, 1982.
1. Press Release, U.S. Att'y Office S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea
Agreement with SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013), availableat http://www
.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Novemberl3/SACPleaPR.php.
2. 15U.S.C.§78j(b)(2012).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (LexisNexis, LexisAdvance through the July 13, 2016 issue of the
Federal Register).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
5. See Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. et al., 13 Crim. 541 (S.D.N.Y.
July 24, 2013), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/
03/25/SAC%20Indictment%20%28Stamped%29_0.pdf (noting in paragraph 6 that "[t]he SAC
ENTITY DEFENDANTS enabled and promoted the Insider Trading scheme through several
means," including hiring practices, financial incentives, and ineffective compliance procedures)
[hereinafter SAC Indictment].
6. See, e.g., id. at 1 15:
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Having been exposed in my time as a lawyer and law professor to
many instances of insider trading that resulted from reckless behavior,
I have found myself pondering the possibility-and considering the
appropriateness-of corporate criminal liability7 for insider trading
based on reckless employee conduct. Could reckless employee conduct
result in a willful violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S and,
therefore, criminal liability for the firm that employs them? I
admittedly am troubled by the possibility. Something just does not
seem right about holding someone (even if that someone is a business
entity) criminally responsible for the less-than-intentional acts of
someone else (even if that someone else is an agent of the business
entity against whom criminal enforcement is sought). What about, for
example, mens rea-the requisite state of mind necessary for criminal
intent-in that context?
This Article explores these areas of concern, proceeding in five
parts. In Part II, the Article reviews the basis for criminal enforcement
of the insider trading prohibitions established in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.8 Part III describes the basis and rationale for corporate
criminal liability, a liability that derives from the activities of agents

[T]he insider trading scheme committed by the SAC ENTITY DEFENDANTS through
the conduct of their agents was facilitated through practices employed by the SAC
ENTITY DEFENDANTS that encouraged SAC PMs and SAC RAs to pursue industry
contact networks to obtain an information 'edge' unavailable to other investors,
without effective corresponding controls to prevent that 'edge' from consisting of
Inside Information.
See also Nate Raymond & Emily Flitter, SAC CapitalAgrees to Pay $1.8 Billion in Largest Insider
Trading Settlement In History, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 10, 2014, 10:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/sac-capital-settlement-2014-4 ("An indictment in July alleged systemic insider trading took
place at SAC Capital involving the stocks of more than 20 publicly-traded companies from 1999
through 2010.").
7. Although the term "corporate criminal liability" is used throughout for ease of reference,
most of what is said in this Article about the potential liability of an employer for employee
conduct relates to both corporations and other forms of entities (as well as to principals of sole
proprietorships).
8. This Article does not undertake to incorporate the continuing debate regarding the
propriety of regulating insider trading. See generally Frank J. Sensenbrenner & Margaret Ryznar,
The Law and Economics ofInsider Trading, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2015) (highlighting
this debate).
Insider trading bans have been among the most controversial aspects of securities
regulation since the SEC condemned the practice in the 1961 Cady Roberts case.
Professor Henry Manne shortly thereafter published his famous book criticizing, on
economics grounds, the decision to prohibit insider trading. Since Manne, there have
been many people skeptical of insider trading bans, and for various reasons.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Rather, it assumes the continued regulation of insider trading at the
federal level, together with the prospect of both civil (private and public) and criminal
enforcement.

2016]

(Not) Holding Firms Criminally Responsible

129

undertaken in the course of the firm's business. Part IV then reflects on
the first two parts-first identifying the potential for corporate
criminal liability for the reckless insider trading violations of
employees under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, then arguing against
that liability and suggesting ways to eliminate it. A brief conclusion
follows in Part V.
IL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OFSECTION 10(B) AND RULE 1OB-5
INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS
Criminal enforcement of the insider trading prohibitions under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S is the root of corporate criminal liability
for insider trading in the United States. A complete description of
criminal liability for insider trading violations under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-S involves two steps. First, one must establish the bases for
unlawful insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S. Second,
one must establish the criminal enforcement authority for insider
trading violations actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S. Both
steps are described in the remainder of this Part of the Article.
A. Insider Trading Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S
Although it is not well understood outside the securities
regulation and white-collar crime communities, liability for insider
trading in the United States is conceptualized as securities fraud.9 The
original codification of federal securities law in the early 1930s
provided for the disgorgement by corporate insiders of deemed profits
on purchases and sales of the corporation's shares made within a sixmonth period as a form of insider trading liability,10 but it did not
include a rule that prohibited or restricted trading by corporate
insiders." Congress has been reluctant to enact federal legislation
defining insider trading over the intervening years. 12
9. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (establishing insider trading
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as "act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" (quoting Section 10(b))); see also, e.g., J. Kelly Strader, (Re) Conceptualizing
Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1422
(2015) ("[I]nsider trading is a form of securities fraud that is primarily judicially-defined ..
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012) (known as the "short-swing profit" rule).
11. Id.
12. See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 612-13 (2008) ("Congress did not
include any definition whatsoever in the statute. No definition has been codified since. Instead,
Congress has-essentially through institutional paralysis-effectively acceded to the judiciary's
development of this area of the law." (footnotes omitted)); Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The
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Insider trading was first recognized as securities fraud actionable
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S just over half a century ago.13 In
1961, an SEC administrative law judge wrote an opinion finding that a
corporate insider who trades in an issuer's stock while in possession of
material nonpublic information relating to that stock without
disclosure of the material information in his or her possession may
violate regulatory proscriptions on the use of practices that operate as
a fraud or deceit on securities purchasers. 14 The administrative law
judge found that those types of practices violate Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 and constitute manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances within the meaning of Section 10(b):
The three main subdivisions of Section 17 and Rule 10b-5 have
been considered to be mutually supporting rather than mutually
exclusive. Thus, a breach of duty of disclosure may be viewed as a
device or scheme, an implied misrepresentation, and an act or
practice, violative of all three subdivisions.... We hold that, in these
circumstances, Gintel's conduct at least violated clause (3) as a
practice which operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers.
Therefore, we need not decide the scope of clauses (1) and (2).16
Subsequently, federal courts credited this argument with Supreme
Court decisions endorsing insider trading as a Section 10(b) violation
in 1980,17 1983,18 and 1997.19 These Supreme Court decisions shaped

the U.S. insider trading doctrine in foundational ways-e.g., by defining
insider status as a function of a duty of trust and confidence, 20 by
identifying the nature and scope of tipper and tippee liability when an
insider wrongfully discloses material nonpublic information directly or
indirectly to a third party who trades, 21 and by extending insider

MisappropriationTheory ofInsider Trading: Outside the Lines ofSection 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819,
847 (1997) ("Congress has twice flirted with codifying a comprehensive definition of 'insider
trading. Both the Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984 and Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 contemplated doing so, but neither altered the then existing substantive
law." (footnotes omitted)).
13. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
14. Id. at 911-13.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
16. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 913 (footnote omitted).
17. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
19. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
20. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 ("[L]iability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.").
21. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (footnotes omitted).
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trading prohibitions to outsiders who breach duties of trust and
confidence in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 22
At the heart of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-S under the established rules in these cases is the breach of a
duty of trust and confidence through trading on, or improper
disclosure of, material nonpublic information. Duties can be breached
through simple or gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional
misconduct.23 Although federal statutes, SEC rules, and decisional law
at the Supreme Court level have not definitively established a predicate
standard of culpability in this regard (referred to as "scienter"),
recklessness is presumed to be a sufficient basis for liability under
Supreme Court dicta (taken together with repeated judicial decisionmaking in the federal courts at the trial and appellate levels). 24
Most of the cases exploring and defining scienter under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-S are securities fraud cases outside the insider
trading context. These cases identify multiple contextual standards for
recklessness, many attempting to describe a level of awarenesssomething analogous to a cognizant indifference to the effect of the
accused's conduct.25 Moreover, judicial opinions disagree as to whether

[T]ippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders . . because it has been
made available to them improperly.... [A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.
Id.
22. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652, 665 (endorsing the misappropriation theory of insider
trading, which generally "premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information," finding that theory of insider trading
liability "both consistent with the statute and with our precedent").
23. Ernst& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) ("Every
Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits
differ on the degree of recklessness required."); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 ("In this opinion
the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud....
We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."); Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust
v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 790 (11th Cir. 2010) ("In this circuit, scienter consists of intent
to defraud or 'severe recklessness' on the part of the defendant."); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[V]irtually every circuit to consider the issue held that
recklessness could amount to scienter under § 10b and Rule 10b-5."); In re Orbital Scis. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("The element of scienter requires the Plaintiffs to
allege that the Defendants acted recklessly or with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud . .
25. See, e.g., Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) ("To win a section
10(b) case, the plaintiff must show either that the defendants consciously intended to defraud, or
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a motive or specific intent to deceive is a necessary predicate to
liability or whether an appreciation of the propensity of the conduct to
deceive is sufficient.26 The law in the area remains largely unsettled as
a result. 27

Scienter in the insider trading context under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-S is no exception. In fact, the exact contours of scienter are
arguably even more ill-defined in the various potential insider trading
settings than they are in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S cases outside
the insider trading context. 28 Rule lObS-1, adopted by the SEC in 2000,
seemingly clarified one scienter issue in insider trading cases by
providing that the awareness of material nonpublic information is a
sufficient basis for liability-that public and private enforcement
agents need not prove that the material nonpublic information was
used in (i.e., motivated) the insider's trade. 29 Yet some courts appear to
that they acted with a high degree of recklessness."); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d at 550 ("[I]t is
clear that recklessness, understood as a mental state apart from negligence and akin to conscious
disregard, may constitute scienter .... ); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47
(2d Cir. 1978), amended sub nom. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., No. 77-7104, 1978 WL
4098 (2d Cir. May 22, 1978) ("Reckless conduct is, at the least, conduct which is 'highly
unreasonable' and which represents 'an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the
defendant must have been aware of it."' (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793
(7th Cir. 1977))); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)
("[T]he danger of misleading buyers must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable
man would be legally bound as knowing, and the omission must derive from something more
egregious than even 'white heart/empty head' good faith." (footnotes omitted)); Goldman v.
McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("An egregious refusal to
see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of gross
negligence which can be the functional equivalent of recklessness." (citing Jordan v. Madison
Leasing Co., 596 F. Supp. 707, 710 (S.D.N.Y.1984))); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp.
275, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd in part, remanded in part, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977):
[W]e hold that to establish the element of scienter in an action brought under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a party must prove injury resulting from a conscious deception
or from a misrepresentation so recklessly made that the culpability attaching to such
reckless conduct closely approaches that which attaches to conscious deception.
See also Donald C. Langevoort, "Fine Distinctions"in the ContemporaryLaw ofInsider Trading, 2013
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 429, 436-37 (describing scienter in the insider trading context, noting that a
desire or purpose to mislead is not required; "awareness of the falsity and its propensity to
mislead is enough").
26. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 437-38 (noting this point of divergence in applicable
court opinions).
27. See, e.g., SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The line between unactionable
negligence and actionable recklessness is not a bright one."); Langevoort, supra note 25, at 436
(noting the convergence on recklessness as the standard of culpability, but observing that courts
"diverge quite noticeably when it comes to explaining precisely what recklessness is").
28. See, e.g., Obus, 693 F.3d at 287 ("Because a defendant cannot be held liable for negligently
tipping information, difficult questions may arise when a tip is not apparently deliberate or when
the alleged tipper's knowledge is uncertain." (internal citations omitted)).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-1(b) (2016); see also Langevoort, supra note 25, at 438-39
(summarizing contentious scienter questions in insider trading cases).
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avoid or ignore the prescriptions of Rule 1Ob5-1.3o Trial and appellate
courts responding to the individual facts in the respective cases before
them identify various principles relevant to scienter determinations, 31
but the resulting body of law is neither clear nor comprehensive.
The overall lack of clarity around the substance of insider trading
law is something that I have commented on at length in other works. 32
It affords enforcement agents a wider base of power in taking
enforcement action. While the broad enforcement authority arising out
of unclear insider trading doctrine may have desirable deterrent
effects, the doctrinal uncertainty may over-deter33 and allow for the
inequitable or otherwise inappropriate exercise of enforcement
discretion. 34

30. See, e.g., SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1045-46 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd on other
grounds, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring the SEC to "show that the defendant knowingly
possessed or used material nonpublic information in formulating and consummating the purchase
or sale of a security," rather than mere awareness of material nonpublic information); see also
Langevoort, supra note 25, at 439:
Prior to the adoption of 10b5-1, some courts in both civil and criminal cases held that
the test was based on use, although possession might create a rebuttable presumption
of use.... [T]his line of case law developed with enough strength that some courts
have ignored the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 and continue even today to make causation
an element of the cause of action, or at least the subject of an affirmative defense.
31. See, e.g., Obus, 693 F.3d at 287 ("[A] tipper cannot avoid liability merely by demonstrating
that he did not know to a certainty that the person to whom he gave the information would trade
on it."); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980) ("One who deliberately
tips information which he knows to be material and non-public to an outsider who may
reasonably be expected to use it to his advantage has the requisite scienter." (footnotes omitted)).
32. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance
in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999 (2012) (addressing a lack of clarity regarding materiality);
Joan MacLeod Heminway, MarthaStewart and the Forbidden Fruit:A New Story of Eve, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1017 (2009) [hereinafter Forbidden Fruit] (describing and illustrating uncertainties in
U.S. insider trading policy and doctrine); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the
Context of Insider Trading:A Callfor Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131 (2003) [hereinafter Materiality
Guidance] (addressing a lack of clarity regarding materiality); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save
Martha Stewart? Observations about Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 247 (2003) [hereinafter EqualJustice] (describing various uncertainties in U.S. insider
trading doctrine).
33. See Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 32, at 1174-77 (describing how
ambiguities in insider trading regulation may result in foregone transactions that would be
efficient and desirable).
34. See Heminway, Equal Justice, supra note 32, at 284 ("The system and enforcement of
insider trading regulation in the United States present significant opportunities for selective
enforcement and the exercise of enforcement bias. These prospects for selectivity and bias arise
out of... the unclear and imprecise substance of U.S. insider trading regulation .... "); Heminway,
Forbidden Fruit, supra note 32, at 1046 ("[G]iven the uncertain basis for insider trading regulation
and the unclear elements associated with potentially violative conduct, enforcement activities
may be directed inequitably or inappropriately....").
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B. Criminal Enforcement of Insider Trading under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-S
Willful violations of the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S may subject
transgressors to criminal enforcement.3 5 Specifically, the relevant
statute provides the following language:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter...
or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made
unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of
this chapter,... shall upon conviction be fined not more than [five
million dollars], or imprisoned not more than [twenty] years, or
both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural
person, a fine not exceeding [twenty-five million dollars] may be
imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this
section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that
he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation. 36
Congressional authority to criminalize violations of federal securities
law is not widely challenged.3 7
However, the existence of dual civil and criminal enforcement
regimes for U.S. insider trading violations raises a number of significant
questions for scholars and other commentators. Among the concerns
are: the unclear relationship between the elements of civil and criminal
actions for the same wrongful conduct; issues that arise from the
potential for civil actions to lead to criminal actions (and vice versa);
and a blurring of the independent rationale for criminal, as opposed to
civil, remedies.3 8 The issues are necessarily interrelated.
Congress' adoption of a law criminalizing insider trading-by
tacking a willfulness requirement onto the elements of a civil action for
insider trading-generates interesting and difficult doctrinal and
practical questions. Paramount among them is the relationship
between willfulness and scienter. Scienter, as a required element of a
civil insider trading claim brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
is widely understood to require at least reckless conduct, as earlier

35. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
36. Id.
37. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar
Criminal Law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 591, 596 (2006) ("[T]here is little controversy about treating
securities crimes as a federal offense. Congress has constitutional jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause to enact laws that regulate capital markets, and the federal interest in
protecting the national securities markets is robust." (footnotes omitted)).
38. Infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
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noted.39 It is generally also understood that conduct representing a
knowing violation of law is willful. 4 0 But is reckless conduct meeting

the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S always or
ever willful? One prominent scholar responds to that question as
follows:
There is no definition of the culpability, or mens rea, element of
"willful" in the criminal statute. In this vacuum, courts have applied
standards that are strikingly similar to the civil scienter standard to
criminal cases. The merger of civil and criminal standards means
that the only distinction between civil and criminal liability is the
standard of proof in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt.41
In a recent article, Professor Kelly Strader describes this struggle
in differentiating the requisite mens rea for criminal insider trading
liability from the civil liability standard of conduct in some detail. 42
This blurring of the culpability elements of the civil and criminal claims
narrows distinctions between civil and criminal claims-perhaps (as
the above quote indicates) to differences in the standard of proof.43
Accordingly, a range of enforcement options may be available for the
same allegedly wrongful conduct, with overlapping authority over that
conduct between civil and criminal investigative and enforcement
agents.
Not surprisingly, public enforcement agents in the Department of
Justice and the SEC typically collaborate-or at least consult-on
insider trading and other securities law investigations. 44 As a result,
39. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of Rule
10b-5 for Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L. REV. 380, 389 (2006)
("[D]ecisional law under the 1934 Act and other federal statutes generally indicates that the
government must at least show that the defendant acted with knowledge of the wrongfulness of
his conduct under the law that he is accused of violating.").
41. Moohr, supra note 37, at 601 (footnote omitted); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
"Unlawful" Mean "Criminal?": Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 198 (1991) ("[A] trend is evident toward the diminution of the mental
element (or 'mens rea') in crime, particularly in many regulatory offenses."); Heminway, supra
note 40, at 389 n.51 ("There is some debate over whether the scienter requirement, as an element
of a Rule 10b-5 claim, collapses into or is synonymous with the willfulness requirement imposed
on criminal prosecutions under Rule 10b-5.").
42. Strader, supra note 9, at 1465-68.
43. See generallysupra notes 41-42 (noting the thin line between civil and criminal liability in
insider trading). Kelly Strader similarly observes: "Courts, including the Supreme Court,
consistently cite and rely upon civil and criminal cases fairly indiscriminately. In fact, it is difficult
to discern a clear distinction between the standards for civil and criminal cases.... Some overlap
between civil and criminal liability is unavoidable .... " Strader, supra note 9, at 1485 n.43.
44. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of Civil and
CriminalActions to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/
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parallel and sequential enforcement actions for insider trading (and
other securities law enforcement actions) have been prevalent and
have become more common. 45 The possibility of both civil and criminal
enforcement arising from the same conduct creates difficult issues for
alleged offenders and their legal counsel. 46 Moreover, the decision on
the part of civil and criminal enforcement agents as to whether and
how to exercise enforcement discretion becomes more complex in this
context, involving investigative and enforcement authorities from
different governmental units. In the criminal enforcement context, the
prosecutor's decision to pursue charges is the critical element. 47
Federal insider trading enforcement discretion is exercised in an
environment that offers fewer and fewer means of distinguishing
between civil wrongs and criminal wrongs. This challenge is not new.
Over twenty years ago, one leading scholar decried "the disappearance
of any clearly definable line between civil and criminal law"4 8 and
noted that "criminal law seems much closer to being used
interchangeably with civil remedies." 49 As to the latter point, it has
been observed that "the use of administrative and criminal penalties

Speech/1370541342996#.VAp5t7xdW5O ("In the vast majority of criminal securities fraud
prosecutions, the SEC's Enforcement staff works closely with the criminal authorities, whether it
be DOJ, the FBI, or state and local law enforcement.").
45. See id. (noting that criminal cases related to SEC proceedings and instances in which the
SEC grants access to its files to other law enforcement authorities had at least doubled between
1993 and 2014).
46. Moohr, supra note 37, at 601. Specifically:
[P]ractitioners must be very careful not to implicate clients in the criminal matter
when representing clients who may have violated civil provisions. Providing
information to administrative authorities or civil parties may result in a forfeiture of
attorney-client and work-product privileges in the criminal case. And the threat of
criminal charges obviously strengthens the government's position in negotiations
over the civil matter.

Id.
47. See id. at 597:
The decision to indict-or not-rests in the discretion of the federal prosecutor in
charge of the case. Nominally, the grand jury investigating the case decides whether a
criminal charge is warranted. Because a prosecutor has great influence over the grand
jury, in practice the decision to indict rests with the government, not its citizens.
48.

Coffee, supra note 41, at 193. Professor Geraldine Moohr notes in this regard that
[t]he only distinctions between civil and criminal liability in many statutes are the
defendant's felonious intent, the mens rea element that bedevils law students, and the
prosecution's burden to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
short, if the government believes it can prove that the defendant acted with criminal
intent-as defined in the relevant statute-a civil violation can be treated as a crime.

Moohr, supra note 37, at 600-01.
49. Coffee, supra note 41, at 199.
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raises constitutional due process issues and obscures the reasons for
and confuses the standards for punishment."5 0
III. THE BASIS AND RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In an environment where criminal culpability is ill-defined and
difficult to distinguish from civil culpability, corporatecriminal liability
has an even more tenuous foundation. A statutory business entity is a
legal person that may be subject to legal action based on its conduct or
position.5 1 Statutes, for example, may make corporations criminally
liable for actions taken by their agents in the ordinary course of the
corporation's business. 52 Yet, this is not common under U.S. federal
law:
[M]ost federal criminal statutes... do not set forth a rule for
imposing vicarious liability. Instead, most federal criminal statutes
refer to crimes committed by a "person" or "whoever," and the
United States Code defines those terms to include corporations and
other business associations. So, while these statutes clearly provide
for corporate criminal liability, they do not set forth a legal rule for
deciding when this should be so.53

50. Moohr, supra note 37, at 601.
51. The observation that corporations are legal persons has been made in legal actions and
scholarship seeking to hold corporations responsible for their wrongful conduct, including
without limitation, court opinions and law review articles on the criminal liability of corporations
and other business entities. See, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1904)
("A corporation can be guilty of causing death by its wrongful act. It can with equal propriety be
punished in a civil or criminal action."); United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 306 (N.D. Cal.
1898) ("[W]hen a statute in general terms prohibits the doing of an act which can be performed by
a corporation, and does not expressly exempt corporations from its provisions, there is no reason
why such statute should be construed as not applying to them, when the punishment provided for
its infraction is one that can be inflicted upon a corporation . . . ."); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essay,
Telling Stories of ShareholderSupremacy, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1049, 1074 (2009) ("To be sure,
Ipersons' often means 'legally recognized actors' in legal jargon: . . corporations, trusts, and other
legal entities may be 'legal persons' in tort, contract, property, criminal, and sometimes even tax
law."); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Discussing CorporateMisbehavior: The Conflicting Norms of Market,
Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2005) ("Environmental law,
constitutional law, criminal law, labor law and so on, generally regulate the corporation as a
Iperson' .... "); see generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporationas a Person for
Purposes of CorporateCriminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 137 (2011) (commenting on the role of
corporate personhood in criminal liability).
52. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 124-25 (2006) (noting that some states model
statutory provisions after the Model Penal Code while "[o]ther states have enacted statutes that
impose criminal liability on corporations through individual statutes addressing specific actions,
or that define 'person' to include corporations and other business entities").
53. Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 65 Bus. LAW. 193, 221 (2009) (footnotes
omitted).
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As a result, the basis for most federal corporate criminal liability is
an agency theory of liability-a variant of the tort liability of a principal
for the actions of its agent. 54
[T]his is the rule when the act is done by the agent in the course of
his employment, although done wantonly or recklessly or against
the express orders of the principal. In such cases the liability is not
imputed because the principal actually participates in the malice or
fraud, but because the act is done for the benefit of the principal,
while the agent is acting within the scope of his employment in the
business of the principal, and justice requires that the latter shall be
held responsible for damages to the individual who has suffered by
such conduct.

Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step
farther in holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the
authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be
controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his
employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he
is acting in the premises.55
Understanding the agency-based legal roots of corporate criminal
liability, however, does not offer us a reason, rooted in policy or theory,
for labeling an entity's conduct criminal rather than tortious.5 6 In fact,

54. Coffee, supra note 41, at 195; see also John P. Anderson, When Does CorporateCriminal
Liability for Insider Trading Make Sense?, 46 STETSON L. REV. 147, 148-51 (2016) (describing the
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,
which endorsed corporate criminal liability as a matter of public policy).
55. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909) (internal
citations omitted).
56. The Court offers the following explanation for its imposition of corporate criminal liability
in New York Central:
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and
officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its
agents to whom it has intrusted authority to act in the subject-matter . . and whose
knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation for which the
agents act. While the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of
corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact that
the great majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted through
these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their
hands, and to give them immunity from all punishment because of the old and
exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take
away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the
abuses aimed at.
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one pair of commentators pointedly note, "The history of the
development of criminal corporate liability is, at bottom, the story of a
practice in search of a theory."57 As a result, commentators divide the
basis for corporate criminal liability in various ways and attack it from
a number of different angles.
The nature of the business entity and a generalized fear of its
societal power and capacity for harm may be a strong motivating force
for the judicial imposition of corporate criminal liability. Yet, this may
not be a sufficient rationale for criminal, rather than tortious, liability.
It is no universal solvent to declare that a corporation should be a
criminal defendant because the aggregation of capital it represents
poses a greater risk of harm if that power is used for criminal
purposes. Such a rationale would support a decision to make the
corporation civilly liable for its misdeeds, but sweeps little farther.
There is, however, no question that this rationale underpins a great
deal of federal law criminalizing corporate conduct. The decision to
criminalize should not be made so casually. Criminal conduct, as
Henry Hart reminded us, "is conduct which, if duly shown to have
taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the
moral condemnation of the community." Criminalizing a broad
range of otherwise marginally acceptable business conduct
trivializes the criminal sanction and breeds contempt for it, at least
among rational actors, which most white collar offenders are.5
Others have similarly noted that the vicarious corporate liability
generally seems better suited to civil, rather than criminal,
enforcement based on the nature of the perceived societal harm:
Conceptually, vicarious criminal liability for failing to prevent the
agent from acting illegally seems a form of behavior that should be
priced, rather than prohibited. This is because society must make a
judgment about the appropriate amount of behavior (i.e.,
preventive monitoring) to demand and cannot take a simple all-ornothing position. Once it is conceded that some level of monitoring
could be excessive, then the cost to the corporation must be
compared to the benefit to society.59

Id. at 495-96.
57. Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal CorporateLiability, 82 IND. L.J.

411, 418 (2007).
58.

Michael E. Tigar, It Does the Crime but Not the Time: CorporateCriminal Liability in Federal

Law, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 211, 213 (1990) (footnote omitted).
59.

Coffee, supra note 41, at 195-96 (footnote omitted).
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Still, others question the vicarious liability of corporations for the
conduct of their agents based on the theories of criminal punishment,
noting specifically that a policy of that strict corporate liability for the
criminal actions of corporate agents serves neither deterrence nor
retribution, in the following terms:
The legal system should not impose criminal liability, as distinct
from civil liability, on a corporation anytime an employee commits a
crime within the scope of employment that is intended by the
employee to benefit the company in whole or in part. Such a system
of strict liability for a corporation, while often warranted and in
tune with the goals of civil liability, has no place in the criminal law.
Strict liability is antithetical to the dual goals in the criminal law of
deterrence and retribution. 60
Ironically, the strict liability of a firm for the criminal activities of
its employees may mean that the firm pays a fine for criminal conduct
that does not inure to its benefit. 61
The criticisms of corporate criminal liability are broad and varied.
Yet, the persistence and cogency of these criticisms have had little, if
any, influence to date on the doctrine. The common law application of
criminal liability to corporations endures and has been expansively
interpreted over time-it appears to be here to stay. 62
Despite the wide-ranging potential for corporate criminal liability,
it has been infrequently imposed. Constraints include memoranda on
the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion over corporate
conduct and the effects of federal sentencing rules applicable to
corporate criminal conduct.6 3 While the sparing use of corporate
criminal prosecutions may make some less concerned about corporate
criminal liability, it is the potential for that liability, rather than its
actual assertion or imposition, that troubles many of those who
criticize the availability of corporate criminal enforcement. 64 The
60. Weissmann & Newman, supra note 57, at 412.
61. See Anderson, supra note 54, at 150 ("The employee's action need not actually benefit the
corporation to satisfy the test; it may even prove detrimental to the corporation." (footnotes
omitted)).
62. See id. at 150-51 ("Ultimately, the two-part New York Central test for corporate criminal
liability has been interpreted so liberally by the courts that it has, as one commentator puts it,
been rendered 'almost meaningless.'" (footnote omitted)).
63. See, e.g., id. at 151-53 (describing these constraints on prosecutorial and penal
discretion).
64. See, e.g., id. at 164. Professor Anderson opines that
[p]rosecutors are mindful of the . . collateral consequences of a corporate indictment.
Experience has taught them that the mere threat of an indictment gives them all the
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possibility of corporate criminal liability typically results in the
retention of specialized legal counsel and management distraction from
the firm's business-both potentially significant costs to the firm over
time. The resulting incentives to settle civil claims and plea bargain
with criminal prosecutors-even for claims and charges that the firm
believes are without merit-may damage the community and society
as a whole more than the potential corporate criminal liability benefits
society. It is this concern with the effects of potential corporate
criminal liability that motivates my argument that reckless employee
insider trading should not result in corporate criminal liability.
IV CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR RECKLESS INSIDER TRADING
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 1OB-5
The potential for corporate criminal liability for reckless employee
insider trading derives from the possibility that the employee's
reckless trading may be deemed to be a willful violation of the 1934 Act
for which the employer is liable under the agency theory-respondeat
superior. This fact scenario is most likely to occur in a private equity,
investment management, or other financial services firm (like SAC).
However, other employers-including, for example, personal holding
companies 65 and acquisition-minded firms-also may engage in
securities trading in the ordinary course of their respective businesses.
The criminal liability of an employer for reckless insider trading of an
employee rests on vague notions of corporate criminal liability-illdefined as a matter of policy or theory-layered on top of uncertainties
about the availability of criminal liability for reckless insider trading
because of the indistinct contours of the requisite element of
willfulness. The availability of criminal liability and sanctions in this
inherently unstable doctrinal environment strains the credibility of
criminal law and weakens its signaling power in the community.
There must be a better way. The idea for that better way is a
simple one, although it may not be easily implemented. Given the
tendentious nature of criminal liability for reckless insider trading and
the questionable footing of corporate criminal liability, this Article
suggests the elimination of corporate criminal liability for reckless

power they need to either force a change in firms' compliance practices, or to force
corporations to cooperate in the government's investigations of the firm or its
employees.
Id. at 163 (footnote omitted).
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 542 (2012) (defining personal holding companies).
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employee insider trading violations. In other words, this Article
proposes that corporate criminal liability be taken off the table
altogether when an employee's asserted violation of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-S is reckless, as opposed to a knowing violation of law.
How might this be accomplished? There are a number of options.
Another article in this publication argues for the elimination of
corporate criminal liability for insider trading based on the type of
insider trading at issue. 66 That solution makes infinite sense based on
the analysis forwarded in that article. This Article, however, takes a
more narrow approach to possible solutions consistent with the
arguments made here, focusing on bespoke options addressing
corporate criminal liability in the specific context of reckless employee
insider trading.
Congress or the courts could, for example, clarify that reckless
conduct is not, by its nature, willful conduct. A rule or interpretation of
this kind would consign enforcement of the employee violation to the
civil realm and thus also relegate any derivative (vicarious) liability to
civil enforcement. This curative option would easily solve the corporate
criminal liability problem identified in the Introduction of this Article. 67
However, resolving the corporate criminal liability problem in this
way also would take away the possibility of criminal enforcement
against the individual. The in terrorem or educational effect on an
individual of potential criminal liability is different, because the
individual, unlike a business entity, may be incarcerated.
[P]rison is the distinctive sanction of the criminal law because it
fulfills a pedagogical function that fines do not. Not only are prisons
highly visible reminders of the deterrent threat of the law, but the
use of imprisonment broadcasts a special communitarian message
about the equality of all citizens before the law.... Alone, it tells

66. See Anderson, supra note 54, at 164-65 (noting that "true insider trading and sourceemployee outsider trading are crimes that cannot be committed by a company. Corporate criminal
liability in these circumstances yields the absurd result of punishing the victims for the crime.").
Specifically, Professor Anderson proposes
[s]tatutory constraints . . on prosecutors when indicting corporations for insider
trading under Section 10(b). Prosecutors should be permitted to exercise their
discretion in bringing indictments against firms whose employees are engaged in
third-party insider or outsider trading within the scope of their employment and for
the benefit of the firm, but they should be expressly precluded from bringing
indictments against corporations for the insider trading of their employees under
Section 10(b) in all other circumstances.
Id. at 163.
67. Supra PartI.
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members of an audience who may identify themselves as belonging
to very different communities (in terms of wealth, race, etc.) that
each is a citizen of the same society, subject to the same duties and
punishment. The use of imprisonment can symbolize the equality of
all before the law, and thus it affirms the existence of a single
community. 68

Although the precise communitarian lessons to be learned by
employees who engage in reckless insider trading may be difficult to
discern given the overall lack of clarity in U.S. insider trading law, 6 9 it
may be desirable to retain the threat of criminal sanctions as well as
civil sanctions for individuals because of the distinctive deterrent and
educative functions of incarceration in that context.
The elimination of corporate criminal liability for reckless
employee insider trading also could be accomplished by circumscribing
corporate criminal liability directly. The U.S. Congress could enact
legislation clarifying that such liability is unavailable or the federal
judiciary could rule that corporate criminal liability for reckless insider
trading by employees is against public policy-or at least not
warranted as a matter of public policy. These two options are narrowly
tailored but would require legislative or judicial attention to codifying
embedded legal concepts (recklessness among them) that currently are
not well defined. The implementation of either approach, therefore,
would require significant additional thought and attention not
undertaken here.
Finally, in the absence of a legislative or judicial response,
prosecutorial guidelines could be issued prohibiting corporate criminal
prosecutions for reckless employee insider trading. Although this
manner of handling the elimination of corporate criminal liability is
suboptimal (given that the rules may more easily be changed), a willing
Department of Justice could implement efficacious guidelines in a
relatively straightforward manner.
Although Congress, the courts, or the Department of Justice may
impose restrictions on corporate criminal enforcement for reckless
employee insider trading, I (like others that have come before me)
understand that a resolution of this kind from these rule-making
institutions is unlikely for various reasons. There is, perhaps, one

68. Coffee, supra note 41, at 224.
69. Id. at 237 ("[T]he 'technicalization' of crime . . means that the broad mass of public
opinion will never quite understand what the law required or why the behavior was illegal."
(footnote omitted)).
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additional, albeit less desirable, alternative: to adjust the imposition of
penalties for corporate criminal liability in this context through
sentencing guidelines. 70 This alternative, however, still allows
enforcement agents to threaten corporate criminal liability in
circumstances where civil liability remedies may adequately serve
society's needs (whether for deterrence, punishment, community
education, or something else).
To that end, an important footnote must be left here to assuage the
concerns of those who worry that eliminating corporate criminal
liability for reckless employee insider trading will serve to
disincentivize firms from monitoring and guiding employee compliance
with insider trading prohibitions. Eradicating corporate criminal
liability for reckless insider trading violations would not absolve firms
from responsibility for their employees' wrongful conduct. The
potential for tort liability (including public-SEC-actions based on
aider and abettor liability for providing substantial assistance to a
primary violator with the required scienter) remains,7 1 as does the
possibility of statutory civil liabilities. In the insider trading area, these
statutory bases for civil liability include, for example, potential
controlling person liability under Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act ("unless
the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action"). 72 In addition, the SEC has authority to levy civil penalties on
employers as controlling persons under Section 21A of the 1934 Act73
or impose a cease and desist order on an employer that causes an
employee's insider trading violation. 74 These potential liabilities and
remedies should provide firms with adequate incentives to ensure
employee compliance with U.S. insider trading prohibitions.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article challenges and ultimately denounces corporate
criminal liability for reckless employee insider trading. The rationale?
Underlying doctrinal, policy-based, and theoretical foundations for this
type of criminal liability are weak to the extent they exist at all. Public
70. See id. at 241-42 (suggesting corporate criminal liability reform through sentencing
guidelines).
71. See, e.g., Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (considering aider and abettor
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in connection with a stock-kiting scheme).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
73. Id.§78u-1(a)(1)(B).
74. Id.§78u-3(a).
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civil liability serves the same objectives as corporate criminal
liability-and more-in this context.
The argument offered in this Article exists at the intersection of a
number of strains in related scholarship. It is, of course, an argument
based in over-criminalization. "Once everything wrongful is made
criminal, society's ability to reserve special condemnation for some
forms of misconduct is either lost or simply reduced to a matter of
prosecutorial discretion."7 5 However, the Article also contributes to
ongoing scholarly conversations about the actual and potential
implications of unclear statutory, regulatory, and decisional law,
including implications that interact with prosecutorial discretion. The
viewpoints of those who read this will undoubtedly be shaped by their
positions on these and other issues, some of which may be in conflict.
Ultimately, achievement of the result advocated in this Article may
be improbable. Regardless, the ideas presented in the foregoing pages
are designed to encourage the consideration of the embedded issues in
the described legal setting and in other similar contexts. These
certainly provide ample opportunity to start new conversations that
may be productive to the development of insider trading law or the law
governing corporate criminal liability. I look forward to those
conversations.

75.

Coffee, supra note 41, at 201.

